Royal Saudi/non-Saudi Marriages and Their Children Part V—Marrying Across MENA

By Chiara

 Four Seasons Hotel Riyadh

The following article مصاهرات الحكام العرب وسيلة لحفظ البقاء describes the political marriages of Saudi Royals with non-Saudi Royals, and with the political elite, across MENA. It reflects some of the Royal Saudi/non-Saudi marriages already posted on FHWS and summarized in Royal Saudi/non-Saudi Marriages and Their Children: Reflections  which also links to the Introduction, Part I King Fahd, Part II Prince Bandar, Part III Prince AlWaleed, and Part IV Prince Khalid. It also anticipates some posts already in progress.

Readers of the past posts will recall that the purpose of these Royal posts is to show the diversity within the Royal Family, and to draw analogies to the diversity within marriages of non-Royal Saudis. The stated purpose of the author, جمانة فرحات, Joumana Farhat, of مصاهرات الحكام العرب وسيلة لحفظ البقاء “Intermarriage among Arab rulers as a means of survival” is to show the benefits and challenges of the contemporary version of the traditional political marriages of Saudi history, where marital alliances among tribes were created to preserve the peace between them, or to advance both—as we have seen with the original Al Saud/Al Wahhab alliance in the Introduction to the Royal posts; and, to cement the peace after wars, as we have seen in the history of the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz Al Saud.

Current alliances link Saudi Royals to MENA countries from Morocco to the GCC. What follows is the original article translated, with equivalent pictures to the originals, and some other relevant ones added.

Intermarriage among Arab rulers as a means of survival

Joumana Farhat

Mohammed Bin Rashid and his wife, Haya

Political marriages join the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, intertwine thrones, and mingle the genealogies of rulers in Arab countries, following the mentality of the political marriage, which is on the increase. Though the current generation does not feel the impact, future generations will see the risks of ambitions to take over oil reserves.

The story of Nasser and Sheikha is the story of two young people who share a love of horse riding, meet, and then get married. It's a story repeated everyday, except that the everyday couple are not usually Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, son of the King of Bahrain, and Sheikha Sheikha Bint Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, daughter of the Ruler of Dubai.Marriage joins together a long list of aristocrats, such that the ruling families in the Arab world in general, and in the Gulf in particular, are now combined.

The UAE leads the list of Arab countries which have intermarriage between members of its ruling family and those of the surrounding countries. In addition to the rulers of Bahrain, the UAE aristocratic network extends to include those from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar. In 2004, Jordan announced the wedding, of Princess Haya Al-Hussein, the half-sister of King Abdullah II, with the Ruler of Dubai, the Vice President of the UAE, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. As is common, a love of horse riding brought them together. As well, previously Sheikh Ahmed bin Ali Al Thani, Qatar's former governor, had married Reem bint Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the sister of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid. Also, the Saudi Prince, Abdul Aziz bin Saud bin Mohammed bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, nicknamed Alsamir, married the daughter of the late UAE president, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan.

As for Jordan, in addition to Princess Haya, another highlight is the marriage of a cousin of Jordan's King to a cousin of Sultan Qaboos. Also, it was reported that an attempt was made by King Abdullah II to marry the daughter of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, Aisha.

In Saudi Arabia, there have been multiple intermarriages with the rulers of Arab countries, including the UAE, Lebanon, and Syria. The Saudi King, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, has been the brother-in-law of Rafaat al-Assad, and the uncle of the current Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, since the eighties, as one of King Abdullah's wives is Rafaat al-Assad’s sister. Also, Prince Talal Bin Abdul Aziz married Princess Mona Riad El-Solh, daughter of President Riad Solh, the first Prime Minister of Lebanon after independence. Marriage and family peace networks extend to Morocco: the late Amir Abdullah (uncle of the current King Mohammed VI) and Princess Lamia Solh married in 1961, after meeting in Paris where they were both studying.

Intermarriage is not only between States, but it is distributed within a single country in a strategic manner, and aims to strengthen each other’s rule; as happened in the marriage of Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Deputy Prime Minister of the UAE, with the daughter of Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum--believed to be the culmination of the reconciliation between the two families, after the emergence of political differences between them.

From the above, it is clear that the Arab rulers now form a network of intermarriages and are interrelated with each other. For example, the son of the King of Bahrain will not only be the new son-in-law of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, but will be a brother-in-law to the King of Jordan, and a relative of both Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad Al Sharqi, the Crown Prince of Fujairah, who each married a daughter of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum. Also, Prince Abdul Aziz bin Saud became, in turn, a relative of the King of Jordan and of the King of Bahrain.

As for the causes of intermarriage among the ruling families, some people believe they contribute to strengthening relations between these countries.This is not something new, especially in the political history of the Arabs; and, the world is full of political marriages that have a role as a social means to achieve political goals. In the opinion of the authors of «Political Marriages in the Mameluke Era», a professor of Islamic history, Fadel Jaber Al-Doha, and University Lecturer Thamer Numan, surmise that the motives behind the marriages of the ruling classes or between the sons and daughters of neighboring countries «is in the political interest, such as trying to limit the privileges of power between them, or an attempt to seize power or gain the trust of some neighboring countries, leading in the end to a secure border ».

GE Peterson, for his part, explains, in a study entitled «Rulers, Traders and the Senate in Gulf Policy: The Function of Family Networks», that this is an essential means by which rulers in the Gulf protect themselves. Family networks configure and start a hierarchy or a chain of command in government and society that is completely loyal to them. The advantages of family networks also include the building of alliances through marriage between royal families to be exploited when necessary.

A prominent example provided by Peterson, is Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali bin Jabor Al Thani, of Qatar, who ruled from 1960 until 1972. Peterson points out that Sheikh Ahmad, after his overthrow in 1972, found a safe haven in Dubai and took up residence there because of his marriage to one of the daughters of Sheikh Rashid Al Maktoum; and, later, also married one of his daughters to one of the sons of the ruling family in the UAE.

Thus, while, on the face of it, equestrian hobbies and heir marriages unite ruling families in the Arab world, underneath, they represent interests and political ambitions. It is feared that in the long run, these family networks will lead to the emergence of power struggles.

The marriage of the sister of King Farouk of Egypt, Fawzia, to Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, who was then Crown Prince of Iran before becoming its Shah, failed to provide political protection. It is rumored that Shah Reza Mirza Khan planned to marry his son, Mohammad Reza to the family of Muhammad Ali in Egypt as a way to expand the foreign political relations of Iran. However, the collapse of the marriage after a period of separation still reverberates even today, in Egyptian-Iranian estrangement, even though there are different rulers and types of rule in each country after the collapse of dynasties in both countries.

Much as these Royal Saudi/MENA marriages may be described as part of the marriage patterns of the progeny of of King Abdul Aziz Al Saud, one is reminded of the marrying patterns of European Royalty, particularly the progeny of Queen Victoria, who together formed much of the Royalty of Europe from Russia, to Greece, Denmark, Sweden, Norway Germany, Spain, and the UK.

While such marriages didn’t preclude love relationships, as Queen Victory herself had with the German Prince Albert whom she married, these familial alliances were both severed and strengthened through WWI and WWII, as England and Germany lined up against each other, and the Tsar in WWI, and the Greeks in WWII sought refuge in Western Europe. Of course the family of Tsar Nicholas and Tsarina Alexandra did not make it, but the families of Prince Philip, the future husband of Queen Elizabeth II, and Queen Sofia of Spain did.

Do you see these Royal Saudi/MENA marriages as politically advantageous, neutral, or creating intra-familial political rivalries as the author of the article suggests?

What happens, in your experience with non-Royal mixed marriages and sibling rivalries?

Are there jealousies created because of opportunities for travel, language and culture acquisition, study and career advancement of different siblings as they choose their marriage partners and on behalf of their respective children?

Given the structure of Arab families—large, close, and extended—do Westerners suddenly find themselves caught in vast sibling rivalries with numerous brothers, sisters, cousins (1^st and 2^nd degree)?

How prepared are they to handle such complexities?

What supports are to be had in these family constellations; and for Westerners in learning how to be a part of them—giving and receiving support?

Any other comments, thoughts, experiences?

Remembrance and Family Heritage in Bicultural Saudi/non-Saudi Families

By Chiara



This past week has been one of Remembrance, not least because of Remembrance Day/ Veterans’ Day on November the 11^th. It made me think about the role of history, collective memory, and family heritage in shaping world view, and an individual’s perception of current events.



In Saudi Arabian history, the Ottoman-Saudi War between Egypt under the Ottomans and the First Saudi State (1811-1818), which included the Al-Saud as well as the primary Al-Wahhab tribe, is significant, but somewhat better known in the West is The Great Arab Revolt. A part of WWI, it is more important to Saudi than other fronts of “The Great War”, particularly as the Sultanate of Nejd, the Hashemites under the Sherif of Makkah, Hussein bin Ali, and irregular, mainly Bedouin, troops under Prince Faisal and TE Lawrence joined with regular Arab and British forces to defeat the Ottomans. The Middle Eastern Theatre of the War, and the Arabia and Southern Arabia Campaigns are addressed little in the West but helped draw contemporary maps and conflicts. Battles were fought in major centres of what is now Saudi Arabia starting from Makkah, then Jeddah, Madinah, Taif, Al Lith, Yanbu, Aqaba, Wadi Musa, and Damascus, a major Ottoman stronghold.



The Saudi-Yemeni War of 1934 establishing Al-Saud control over disputed territories probably has greater significance in Saudi than in the West despite a write-up in Time Magazine on May 14, 1934 ARABIA: Fall of Yemen. Border disputes and questionable allegiances are again present in the most recent Saudi-Yemen conflict.

WWII, in which Saudi stayed neutral until declaring war against the Axis in March 1945, may not be as important in Saudi collective memory as later wars of independence across MENA, which are largely in the background of Western consciousness--except perhaps for the Six-Day War of June 5-10, 1967 to which Saudi contributed troops, and where they suffered losses.



However, the Middle Eastern Campaigns of WWII determined much about what was being configured around Saudi Arabia, in Iraq, the Levant, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Aden. The end of the war, when Saudi sided with the US, led almost directly over the next very few years to the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956.



I grew up with the idea of Canada’s heroism in WWI (Vimy Ridge) and WWII (Dieppe), the cannon fodder theory (Canadian troops in front, UK and US behind), and a nation of peace keepers:  Lester Bowles Pearson, then a Canadian Diplomat, later Prime Minister, originally suggested the idea of a UN peace keeping force to maintain the tentative peace among Great Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt during the Suez Crisis of 1956, and won the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for it.

Largely unmentioned were Canada’s role in the 19^th Century Boer War, and in the 20^th Century Korean War; and, the Vietnam War happened to someone else. However, there were Canadian vets of the wars of the 20^th Century, including individuals who served in Vietnam with US forces. Trust me; there is nothing that strikes fear in the heart of an ER physician or psychiatrist like “Vietnam vet…on something…maybe PCP (Angel Dust)”.



The European theatre, rather than Pacific or North African one, during WWI and WWII, was the prime subject of study and commemoration. For WWI the French Front was in the history texts, not the others; including the Italian one, which I learned more of only recently, even though it had a major impact on my family’s personal history. Discovering that the frontline wavered back and forth through my paternal grandfather’s home region of Italy, through his home town, his college town, and the main railway town, gave greater prescience to my great-grandmother’s urging him to leave the country as there was about to be a war. She, of course, meant to move temporarily to Ticino, the Italian region of Switzerland, whereas he left for Montreal and never returned.



The disastrous Battle of Caporetto, on the Italian Front in WWI, is what gave rise to the myth of Italian cowardice in battle, a myth that would serve WWII propagandists well. Squandered by an Italian General’s ineptitude, and mowed down by superior Austrian and German forces, many of the Italians who weren’t among the 11,000 killed, 20,000 wounded, and 265,000 taken prisoner, deserted.

Ernest Hemingway was there, and captured the aftermath of the battle in his novel, A Farewell to Arms.

Only recently, when curious about whether literary scholarship in Post-Colonialism extended to Italian literature, did I discover Italian colonialism in a more graphic way; and, on meeting Libyan students, in a more personal way. The myth of Italian cowardice in fighting doesn’t resonate with them—far from it. They know, and have family recall of the colonial wars when 20-50% of the Libyan population died, most in forced marches through the desert and prison camps, and Omar Mukhtar’s “trial”.



It wasn’t until I lived in Hong Kong that I learned of the Canadian presence in the Pacific theatre and the Battle of Hong Kong. More cannon fodder theory too! The small British garrison had recently received reinforcements. Along with the Indians and the Scots, the Canadian troops were newly arrived, with no battle experience, and had been sent only in the hope that the Japanese could be slowed, not stopped, for at least 3 weeks.








The Japanese overran the Gin Drinker’s Line in 3 days, and the Allied troops began retreating onto Hong Kong Island, over 2 more days, with the Rajput Battalion fighting the rearguard action, until on the 5th day the colony fell.





Canada is currently reshaping our history teaching, to the public at large, to aspiring citizens, and to public school students. On this account, we are more active combatants than peace keepers. This is evident in the news, on the streets, and in Remembrance Day ceremonies. In a conversation about Remembrance Day with an older friend, the daughter of an elderly WWII vet, we initially wandered through the politicization of this year’s memorial services. We discussed how the 60^th anniversary of the ending of WWII saw scandalously little official recognition, whereas the one this week was filled with pomp and official circumstance.

 Even our next head of state, Crown Prince Charles and our future Princess morganatic, Duchess Camilla attended in appropriate regalia.

Prince Charles, Lieutenant-General of the Canadian Forces, wore his full dress Canadian military uniform, as did our Commander-in-Chief, Queen Elizabeth II’s representative as head of state, Governor General Michaëlle Jean, a Haitian-French-Quebecker-Canadian, married to a Frenchman, wear hers. Their daughter, Marie-Éden, an adopted Haitian girl, was not present.






While my friend and I agreed that it is all political, she is incensed on behalf of her father, and I think the Conservative government is pandering to the Canadian Right, and ginning up militarily to keep combat troops in Afghanistan or where ever else Obama wants us. Even McGill Students honoured Remembrance Day with Afghanistan in mind.






We then moved on to Major Hasan, whose victims were also remembered this week. In the blogosphere John Burgess of Crossroads Arabia has an excellent series of posts and comments documenting the events and the international press response, the most recent in the series being “Two more Approaches to Major Hasan”; and Jehanzeb of Muslim Reverie has written on the events from the perspective of the implications for Muslim Americans, in “No One Hijacked Islam”.

On this topic my friend and I departed intellectual company rather dramatically—or at least as dramatically as 2 professional women in a café can manage. She is too polite and cautious to say Islamic jihad or 5^th column but it was there in the undertones of her impression of the events at Fort Hood. She then asked, my impression “shrink to shrink”.

Having asked the question, she didn’t like the answer: that a highly ethical officer was put in an untenable ethical conflict of values, was not allowed an honourable way out, and faced with imminent deployment, had a psychotic break—no previous psychiatric history necessary, no prior terrorist intent evident.

She also didn’t like my proofs: the army promoting him recently; his academic presentation calling for conscientious objector status for Muslim Americans; his research on extremists in the interest of improving care for American Muslims in the US military, and his attempts to resolve his conflict of conscience through ethical channels—remaining stateside, or leave the military and pay back whatever monies were owed for his education.

My medical, academic, and Abrahamic cultures clashed with her corporate, military, and Christian ones. By the time we got to a thorough discussion of conscientious objector status we were right back to which immigrants were allowed to serve in WWI and WWII in which theatres, and our respective Italian Canadian, and German Canadian family heritages.

My Moroccan husband grew up learning of Morocco’s place in international history.During WWI Morocco was a newly created French Protectorate, having lost the war against colonization in 1912. Some Moroccans served in the Troupes Coloniales, Armée d’Afrique in WWI, under French officers of course.

and again in WWII:

We have both met enough Moroccan veterans of the French military to know how collective political and social issues have impacted their individual lives in terms of stigma, envy, and (lack of) military pensions or recognition.
 
Similar issues run more stormily through French-Algerian history, and play out in French politics to this day, with the extreme right Front National being openly racist and xenophobic. Its founding president, Jean Marie Le Pen, spent his military service torturing Algerians, and now, when not politicking against all non-Gallic non-Roman Catholic inhabitants of France, taunts various French icons who also are neither Gallic nor Roman Catholic. Singer Patrick Bruel was one, with Le Pen insisting on mocking his original Sephardic name, Benguigui.

Le Pen also forced 3 time FIFA World Player of the Year, Zinedane Zidane (Zizou), out of his apolitical stance to defend his father against false charges by LePen and his surrogate that Zidane was a “fils de l’Algérie française”, implying either a non-Frenchman or a traitor to Algeria, and that his father was a harki, that is, served with the French Forces against Algerians in Algeria, during the war of decolonization--a charge that still carries very negative connotations. Faced with death threats before the 2001 France-Algeria match, Zidane finally broke his silence on his personal life, and issued a statement identifying his father as a proud Algerian from the Kabyle, and denying that he was ever a harki.

Le Pen, was further unhappy that the face of the championship French National Soccer team, whom so many fêted, bore the features of French colonialism.



Similarly, my husband’s family history is more marked by colonization and decolonization. Older family members have a perfect “Bonjour, comment-allez vous?” even if no other French. Those who were schooled by the French during the time of the Protectorate lack high level standard Arabic linguistic and literary skills. Some used their French education to work for the French by day and against the French by night, as members of the Moroccan underground. Hmmm, “terrorists” in my midst?

Although he was born post-Independence, his generation still bear the sequelae of “colonization syndrome”, sensitivity to racism, to discrimination, and to implications (intended or not) of cultural inferiority. Early in our relationship I once used the word “civilization” (referencing tomato chopping styles) humorously and got a negative reaction, as it is/was one of the buzzwords of French Colonialism. Over the course of our relationship, other differences of cultural interpretation or heritage have resulted in other occasional infelicities of word choice. While we are generally diplomatic, understanding, and appreciate each other’s intent, a very few other in-laws have chosen not to be so generous.



Saudi-American, like other Arab/non-Arab or Muslim/non-Muslim, couples have perhaps faced some of their greatest challenges post-9/11, an event which has altered international relationships, resulted in global traveling challenges for all, and greatly impacted the general view of Muslims, Arabs, and perhaps Saudis in particular, given the nationalities of the hijackers and the origins of the instigators. Though Saudis themselves reject this action, both officially and personally, border guards, airport officers, and some non-Saudis are less understanding.

9/11 is now part of the international historical fabric for all, with each of us bringing a cultural/religious and perhaps family heritage to our understanding. If there is one thing currently certain about the Major Hasan shooting at Fort Hood, it is that cultural tensions underpinned it, and colour the reactions to it.



Closer to home:

What differences of cultural and family history have impacted your relationships?
How do you resolve these?
If you are a Saudi abroad, what impact has your understanding of world history/current events had on your relationship with the nationals where you are?
What are your children learning in school that is similar to or different than their family heritage(s)?
How does the teaching of history evolve in the countries you are familiar with, including Saudi, and what impact does that teaching have on the world view of the citizenry?
Any other comments, thoughts, experiences?